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A PARTNER.

The separate property of a :artner consists of that which he owns

aside from others,

and

that which he possesses in conjunction with others.
As to the former class there car. be no question as
to what it

is; it

stands out distinct, unhampered

by the questions of joint ownership. The latter,
however,

vuili admit of a preliinary examination.
A rartnershir is a relation created by the

"conrtract of to
money,

effects,

or --,orc persons to -!lace their
labor and shill,

them in lawful coLzicrce,

or some or all of

or business,

and to divide

the profits and bear the losses in certain proportions."

(3 Kent's

Canm., 23)

joint ownership of property.

It involves the
The question which
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arises in this conncction is, What is a :partner's
interest therein?

it is a chose in action.
It is not the

(Staats v. Bristow, 73 N.Y., 204)

interest of a tenant in com=mon either at law or in
equity.

Tenants in coiwm.on do not contemplate a

division of the p-ofits while together.

On the

other hand, a sharing of the profits is a vital
characteristic of a partnershi-.

The members of a

firm depend upon each other for the make up, or
sonnel, of the concern.

e.r-

it is a machine, so to

speak, compose. of different members working harmoniously to accomplish the same purpose.

Fach mem-

ber is selected by the others for his particular
ability along certain lines.
is

a

personal t-,-t,

In other words, it

.d can not be delegated.

cannot be the interest oj

a tcranI

It

ii, cor=on for then

the fundamental purpose of tho relation woiuld be
destroyed.

What right should one partner have to

substitute for himself, a stranger, whose connection with the firm '7as never in the contemplation
of the partners? (Burnett v.

Snyder,

70 N.Y., 344)
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The necessity, in business affairs carried on by
partnershils, for the utmost good faith in all transOn account

actions, negatives such a proposition.

of this inviolability of the rights of the other
partners, the introduction of a new member, or rather,
the atterapted introduction of such an one, dissolves
the firm,

(Mlarquand v. N.Y.Manuf.Co., 17 Johns.,

525) though Lindley, in his worn on partnership,
qualifies this statement by stating that a partnership at will would be thus dissolved, but that in
one not at rill this act simply gives the other
partners a cause for dissolution.

The authority

cited has been approved in later opinions in the
same jurisdiction and allows no qualification of the
rule, though Lindley's reasoning is sound.
on Partnership,

(Lindley

303)

A pa-tner has no undivided interest in the
firm property of which he can dispose;

it

is

a right

to an accounting--an ascertainment of the amount
over and above the liabilities of the concern.
Such a right is enforced in equity and thither should
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a partner, or one oco'pying his position, seek relief.

So that, if the p-rtner's interest is taken

to satisfy the claims of his creditors, they can
reach nothing but what that share represents in the
final accounting.

A sheriff, with an execution,

reaches nothing more.

He cannot sell an undivided

interest; its non-existence prevents.that.
levy be on all the goods of the firm,

if his

in satisfying

the claim against the debtor-partner, he can sell but
this same interest.

Taken in the light of the de-

cisions, a partner's interest as a chose in action,
has been held to be barred by the lapse of time prescribed by the statute of limitations. (Knox v.
Gye,

5 L.R.Eng.& ir.4pp.,

656)

Upon the death of a 'rartn.er, and the consequent dissolution of the firm, the legal interest
in the assets goes to the surviving members and they
have the exclusive right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of them in the performance of their dutiesin
closing up the affairs of the partnership as they
deem best for all parties interested.

This legal
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title of the survivors is held subject, however, to
the equitable rihts

of the representatives

of the

deceased partner to have a proper apilication made
of the proceeds.

So that they m-y require the due

application of the assets to the pyraent of partkLership debts, but the time, manner, and mode of so
doing are :,urely matters of administration anmd,

as

such, under the exclusive control of the surviving
The interest of there representatives,

partners.

is, then, a mere contingency which may, or may not,
ripen into a legal right, upon the existence, or nonexistence, of a surplus after the ray-ent of all the
debts.
It

is

generally stated that partition of

partnership cannot be had, and, although there are
cases cited at times as holding the contrary view,
they are few in number, and some of them, at least,
doubtful authorities.

A moments reflection will

call to mind substantial reasons in support of the
proposition.
case?

How can you have partition in such a

The partner's interest is not a tangible;
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an ascertained quantity.
dividel interest.

He has not even an un-

What he will receive depends up-

on the existence of surplus assets after the payment
In what way can a mere naked

of all the debts.

Surely there must be a definite

right be divisible?

thing in order to have partition, and if that does
not exist, hov cal it

be had?

But a partner can

comiel a sale of the partnership property.

This

he accompllshes by means of the right he has, upon
dissolution, to have the whole assets disposed of in
a'justment of matters between the partners. (Wild
v. Milne, 26 Beaven, 504)
Having deter ained the character of the
separate property of a partner, the next step is, in
this article, to determine how it is affected by various situations in
pear,

then,

which it

figures.

it

will ap-

that a discussion of this question best

resolves itself into, and may be stated under the
following classes,

or typical cases:

(a)

The Liabil-

ity of the Separate Property to Prouess on a Firm
Debt;

(b) The Assignment of Separate Property by a

-7-

Partner for a Partnershil: Debt;

(c)

The Distributiol

of the Separate Property of a Ban7zrupt Partner;ald;
(d)

The Distribution of the Separate Estate of a

Deceased Partner.

The Liability of the Separate Property to
Process on a Firm Debt.

The question in this class of cases generally arises where there are conflicting claims of
partnership and separate creditors.

The Individ-

ual creditor insists that his debt only shall be
satisfied from the separate estate, while the firm
creditor maintains that he shall share in the separate estate because he exte:.ded credit upon the faith
of the liability of each and every partner, jointly
and severally.

7nat justice can there be in saying

that"A" have a claim against !'X,, and "Y",

co-partners,

"B", a creditor of "Y", can compel "A" to seek satisfaction from the estate of "X" alone, whether it
be sufficient to cancel the debt or not?
no such right can exist, unless "Y",
sake, has a right in

equity,

Surely

for his own

to co-el

A'

to see',

payment from that source.

Thoiifgh the well estab-

lished equity rule is, that, as between the joint
and separate creditors of partners, the partnership
property is to be first applied to the payment of the
partnership debts,

and the sepa.rate pro-erty of the

individual partners to the paynent of their secarate debts; and that neither class of creditors can
claim anything from the fund which belongs primarily
to the opposite class until all the claims of the
latter are satisfied, it is limited in its application to equitable assets only.

Equity tribunals

had never sought to over-ride, or in any way interfere with an absolute right of priority at law.
So that the existence at law of the right of firm
creditors to pursue both the joint and separate
estates, to the extent of each, for the satisfacticn
of their joint demands, has been given full faith
and credlit in equity.

(Meech v. Allen, 17 N.Y.,

300)

The position is even stronger where an absoaute right
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of legal priority is given by force of a positive
statute, as in the case of a judgment.
at law is not with out reason.

This rule

Each partler is

liable in solido for the debts of the partnership
and,

though technically it

has been called a joint

liability, yet each is liable for the entire debt.
But a several suit cannbt be brought to enforce it.
The judgment should be against all the partners,
but the execution may be enforced against so many
of them as will cancel the debt, and a firm creditor
with a first execution against the individual rroperty of a partner takes precedence of a separate
creditor with a second execution against the swae
prorerty.
On the other hand, if equity did not follow the law in

this case,

princiyles a-crlied

by

that tributal could be resorted to and both the assets of the partnership and of the in-ividual rartner would be saved to the firm creditor.

This re-

sults from the aprlication of what is technically
termed "the rartner's equity.,'

Each partner has

-l1-

the personal right in equity to have the assets of
the partnership first applied to the payment of the
firm debts, and by a subrogation recognized in
chancery, the joint creditors receive the benefit
of this right.

This is not the rule followed,

however, for, as was previously stated, equity follows the lgw.

The Assignment of Separ-ate Property

y a

Partner for a Partnership Debt.

As a r1rimary rrorosition under this division, the rtile may be stated to be,

that a partner,

while he has control of his own -roperty,

and even

when he becomes insolvcnt (Crook v. Rindskolf, 105
N.Y., 482) has the
individual,

e-fect legal right to aply his

as well as yartnership,

propuerty to the

payment of the partnershi-, debts, because he is under
the legal obligation as a member of the firm to pay
the debts owing by the firm, or by himself as a member thereof.

(Smith v.

Howard,

20 How.Pr.Rop.,

124)

And this obligation is just as binding and perfect
in

its

nature and effect as is

an individual indebtednesz.

the obligation to pay
The force of this rule

may be appreciated when it is stated that the rights
of the partnership creditors are so carefully guard-

ed that a transfer made, or a lien given, by one
member of the firm, transferring or incumbering the
eerpus of the partnership property to pay,

or secure

an ihdividual debt, is void as to such creditors,
unless it is shown that the firm is solvent and sufficient assets remain to cancel the partnership indebtedancs¢(Menagh v.Whitwell,

52 N.Y.,

146)

There are two ways by means of which he
may dispose of such property, however, and the
transfers will be valid.

They are, first, where

the firm is solvent and sufficient property remains
to pay the partnership debts; and, second, where a
bonafide

sale has been made by a retiring partner

in a solvent firm of two members, to his co-partner,
the latter assuming the debts.

By this transfer

the property, formerly belonging to the firm,becomes
the separate property of the purchasing partner, and
the partnership creditors are not entitled to any
preference as against his individual creditors in
case of his subsequent insolvency.

This is a set-

tled rule of law.(Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Ves. 119;

Dimon v. Hazard, 32 N.Y., 65)

Such transfer is

not to be taken, however, as the sole act of the
one partner.

It is the act of both partners joint-

ly, for it is participated in by both, and they,
having the power to dispose of the corpus of the
joint property, and exercising that power bona fide,
can divest the title of the firm as effectually as
if they had joined in a transfer to a stranger, for
it must be conceded that the creditors have no lien
which.would affect the title of a purchaser from
the firm.

But so long as the property remains in

the possession of the purchasing partner, it is liable to execution for partnership debts.
A proper question in this connection is
in regard to the effect of transfers of the partner's
chose in action on the rights of creditors.

Where

the character of the property remains unchanged and
no act has been done by the firm to divest its title, will the transfer, by the partners, of their
respective individual interests to different persons operate to discharge them from the claims of
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firm creditors, or will the interests still remain
subject, in the hahds of the transferees, to the deThere are conflicting

mands of those creditors?
views on this question.

The rule adopted by the

Supreme Court of the United States, in Case v,

Beau-

regard, ( 99 U.S., 119) is to the effect that so
long as the equity of a partner to have the property applied to the satisfaction of the partnership
debts remains, just so long can the joint creditors
have a remedy against the property, but when it is
gone, the rights of the creditors are lost.
this case, the court say,

"

In

The joint estate is

converted into the separate estate of the assignee
by force of the contract of assignment,

and it

makes no difference whether the partner sells to
the other partners, or to a third person, or
whether the sale is made by him, or under a judgment against him.
gone.'

It

In

declares,

either case the equity is
in

effect,

that a partner

loses his right to have the firm assets applied to
the payment of the firm debts;
do is not yersonal.

that his right so to
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On the contrary,

the other and bettcr view

is

emhatically stated by Judge Rapallo in

v.

7Thltwell, (supra)

It is,

"

Mena.h

that the title

of

the firm, as between it and its creditors, to the
corlus of the property, or at least to so much of
it as is necessary for the debts, is not divested
by these separate transfers to strangers."

He

further declares that the equity of a partner to
have the partnership property applied to the payment of the partnership debts, is a personal right
of which the partner cannot divest himself by a
sale of his interest.
language,

"

To quote the learned judge's

Could it be tolerated that the interest

of a partner should be sold under execution against
him, on which sale only the value of his interest
in the surplus could be realized, abd that the purchaser should be allowed to take the corlous of the
property and leave him liable for the debts ?"
partner cannot transfer to his assignee more than
he himself is entitled to, namely, his share after
all accounts have been taken. ( Hanhkey v. Garrett,

A
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1 Ves., 241, Am. Ed. note ;
Ves., 557 )

Young v. Keighly, 15

No person deriving under a partner

can be in a better condition than the partner himself. ( Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445 )

Neither can a

partner, by an assignment of his interest take from
the creditors, or other partners, the right to have
their claims against the firm satisfied out of ite
property,

Hence a mortgage, made by one partner,

of his undivided interest, cannt avail against the
creditors of the partnership who attach the partnership property. ( Lovejoy v.

Bowers, 11 N .H.,

404)

It would seem that enough has been written to demonstrate that the better and more logical view is
the one which protects the partnership creditors and
does not dissolve the firm as to them.

The Distribution of te Separate PzirL
of a Bankrupt Partner.

Born of the Roman law, fostered by the
courts of Spain and Fn-land,

and a'2o-ted by the

judiciary of the United States,
partnershi; property shall first

the rule,

that

satisfy partner-

chip debts and soparate proyerty first

satisfy in-

dividual debts, has become firmly embraced in
laT
gcverning bankrupts,

the

assignees arcd insolvents.

Could the good fathers of the Civil la"7 have knovim
v.hat uneasi~ess they have occasioned mofc:eii.

lcxuycrc,

b -e at o
to ::>7it its

co =..er-

and the r-any sile: t mCrledictions 1--

a host .of ju-c s

",ho
ave b-eon fomccd

existepoo, tho7gh doi-

a-rs

they would have repented long since in sack-cloth
and ashes.

The courts of England were in a state

of delightful uncertainty for noarilra century as to
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the adoption of the rule in that jurisdiction,
until finally Lord Loughborough,

in

Elton, ( 3 Vos.,

6aso of Ex rarte

it

Like

st.t(d.

has boon subjected to objections,

.:hich, in this insta-ce,
number.

the

238 ) squarely

ancd forcibly enunciates the rule a
all :'~.-es

1796, in

have bo

no-n
ot a Fe'

in

The result has been to withhold the appli-

cation of the rule where the joint creditors have
no fund or ncans of satisfaction of any
is

the case where there is

living solvent partner.
exist, however.

zinc,

which

no joint estate and no
Both conditions must co-

Just what

"

no joint estate

means has been a hone of contention, but it nows
appears to be well settled that if

the joint cred-

itors can get a dividend from the partnership estate,
no matter how small, theyl cannot share with the
separate creditors in

the separate estate;

and,

it

is said, that if the joint estate is so small as to
be entirely consumed in costs, there is no joint
estate.

(Bates on Partnership,

see.

833)

Where

there is no living solvent partner, the joint cred-
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itors cannot prove jari p

with the separate

creditors in the individual estate.

By this is

meant a partner from whom no fund, however small,
can be derived. (Bates on Partnership, sec. 835)
And it seems that his mere insolvency does not, as
would his bankruptcy, entitle the firm creditors to
prove upon the other partner's separate estate,

( Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige, 167;
anda, 7 0. St., 179;
Emanuel v.

Rodgers v. hLer-

Cleghorn v. Bank, 9 Ga. 319;

Bird,lAla.,

596;

Sperry's Estate,

1

Ashmead, 347 ) but this is doubted by some authorities. ( Merrill v. Neili, 8 How., 414;
Thornburgh, 15 Ind.,

Weyer v.

124 )

There has been not a little discussion as
to the arbitrary character of this rule, but aside
from the fact that its adoption was to give a correlative to the rule admitting separate creditors to
participation in the surplus remaining from the
partnership fund after the payment

of the joint

obligations, there are substantial reasons in its
Chief Judge Bartley, in Rod-ers v. Moransupport.
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da, (supra) has stated these so comprehensively,
that an extended quotation from his learned opinion
in that case, seems justified.

"Thrat then,"

Judge Bartley says, "is the true foundation of the
rule which gives the individual creditor a preference over the partnership creditor in the distribution of the separate estate of a partner?

To

say that it is a rule of general equity, as has
been sometimes said, is not a satisfactory solution
of the difficulty; for the very question is,
whether it be a rule of equity or not.

In the

distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality
is equity; and to say that the rule which gives the
individual creditor a preference over the partnership creditor in the sep~arate estate of a partner,
is a rule of equality, does not still rid the subject of difficulty.

For leaving the rule to

stand, wcgives the p-reference to the joint
creditors in the partnership property, and perfect
equality between the joint and individual creditors
is, perhaps, -rarely obtainable.
ever, more equal a72

just,

That it

is,

as a general rule,

howtham
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any other which can be devised, consistently with
the preference to the partnership creditors in the
joint estate, cannot be successfully controverted.
It originated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership creditors in the joint estate,
and for the purposes of justice, became necessary as
a correlative rule.

W7ith what semblahce of equity

could one class of creditors, in preference to the
rest, be exclusively entitled to the partnership
fund, and, concurrently with the rest, entitled to
the separate estate of each partner?

The joint

creditors are no more meritorious than the separate
creditors; and it frequently happens, that the separate debts are contracted to raise means to car-ry
on the partnership business.

Independent of this

rule, the joint creditors have , as a general thing,
a great advantage over the separate creditors.
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership
fund, they take their distributive share in

the

surplus of the separate estate of each of the several partners,

after the payment of the separate cred-
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itors of each.

it

is

a rule of equity,

that where

one creditor is in a situation to have two or more
distinct securities or funds to rely on, the court
will not allow him, neglecting his other funds, to
attach himself to one of the funds to the prejudice
of those who have a claim upon that, and no other
to depend on.

And besides the advantage, which

the joint creditors have, arising from the fact,
that the partnership fund is usually mu.ch the largest,

as men in

embark

trade,

in

a great majority of cases,

their all, or the chief part of their prop-

erty, in it

,

and besides their distributive rights

in the surplus of the separate estates of the other
partners, the joint creditors have a degree of security for their debts and facilities for recovering them, which the separate creitors have not;
they can sell both the joint and separate estate on
an execution, while the separate creditor can sell
only the separate property and the interest in the
joint effects that may remain to the partners after
the accounts of the debts and effects of the firm
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are taken, as between the firm and its creditors,
and also as between the partners themselves.

With

all these advantages in favor of partnership creditors it would be grossly inequitable to allow them
the exclusive benefit of the joint fund, and then a
concurrent right with individual creditors to an
equal distribution in the separate estate of each
partner.

What equality and justice is there in

allowing partnership creditors, who have been paid
eighty per centum on their debts out of the joint
fund, to come in pan

rassu with the individual

creditors of one of the partners, whose separate
property will not pay twenty per centum to his separate.creditors?

How could it be said to be an

equal distribution of the assets of insolvents
among their creditors?

It is true that an occasion-

al case may arise when the joint effects are proportionably less than the separate assets of an insolvent partner.

But as a general thing, a very

decided advantage is given to the partnership creditors, notwithstanding this preference of the

individual creditors in the separate property.
And that advantage, arising out of the nature of a
partnership contract, is unavoidable.

Some gener-

al rule is necessary; and that must rest on the
basis of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the joint effects, and their
further right to some claim in the separate property of each of the several partners.

The pref-

erence, therefore, of the individual creditors of
a partner in the distribution of his separate estate,
results, as a principle of equity, from the preferences of partnership creditors in the -artnership
fumds, and their advantages in having different
funds to resort to, while the individual creditors
have but the one."
Contrary to this are arrayed reasons,
apparently substantial, but upon mature consideration, not so convincing.

Briefly, they are, that

the rule is not founded u1on principle; that the
creditors of the firm are also creditors of each
partner,

while the separate creditors of one partner
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are not creditors of the firm; and, that such a
rule affords facility for shifting f'unds from one
portion of one's estate to another, to which it may
be said in reply,

that such will always be the case

where a debtor may prefer a creditor by paying or
securing one and not another.
There is a rule in force in Kentucky 7hich
is a modificatfon of the proposition, to the effect
that where a firm is

insolvent and there are part-

nership and separate estates,

and both classes of

creditors, the firm creditors, having exhausted the
joint estate, must wait, before proceeding against
the separate estate, until the individual creditors
have received an equal percentage from the separate
estate,

than the two classes share Tari 2assu in

the balance. ( Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Keiser,
2 Duval, 169 )

In declaring this rule, the

learned judge frankly admitted that the principle
was long and well established, but seemed to overlook considerations vital to his proposition .
Such is the situation of the law on this
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branch of the question.

'7.ile there are reasons

in favor of each of the several

positions, the pre-

ponderance of authority is in favor of the old established rule so forcibly laid down by Lord Loughborough,

in

Ex parte Elton.

The Distribution of the Se-.arate Estate
of a Deceased Partner.

Partnership creditors reach the estate of
a deceased partner in equity.

As t6 the time when

they can reach it, there are conflicting views, the
generally excepted rule in the United States being
that inability to collect from the surviving partner
must be shown before proceeding in equity, while
in England, the courts have allowed them to proceed
in equity the same as they would at law.
For a considerable length of time prior
to thecase

of Devaynes v. Noble, ( I Mer., 397

)

the decisions of the English Court 'of Chancery seem
to have been in harmony with the New York view.
There were various reasons for the change, but the
particular and important one was that in the earlier
cases it had been assumed that the liability in

equity of the estate of the deceased partner was
brought about by a species of equitable transfer to
the creditor of the right of the surviving partners
to insist that the estate of their late associate
should contribute to the payment of the debts of
the firm, but upon its being held subsequently that
the obligations of partners were to be regarded as
joint and several, the English courts said, that,.in
all

cases of that kind,

creditors had a right to

pursue their remedies against all or either of
their debtors.

As a natural consequence of the

adoption 6f this view, they held that the creditors
might proceed immediately dn equity against the
represohtatives of a deceased partner regardless of
the fact as to whether thej had exhausted their
legal remedy against the surviving partners.

The

New York courts did not follow this Change and their
decision, in do declining, seems to be supported by
sound reasoming.

The course of the English courts

naturally led to the application in an equity proceeding of the strict legal rules applicable to
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suits at law and the setting aside of many equitable
considerations of great force.
These have been
very clearly stated by Judge Selden, in Vogrhis vx,
CAIlds' Executors. ( 17 N.Y., 354 )

He says, in

part, " The surviving partners succeed primarily to
all the rights and interests of the partnership.
They have the entire control of the partnership
property and the sole right to collect the partnership dues.

The assets of the firm are of course

to be regarded as the primary fund for the payment
of the partnership debts,

and it

would seem equitable

at least, that the parties having the exclusive
possession of the fund should be first called upon.
The answer given to this by the English courts,
that the representatives have their remedy over,
seems hardly satisfactory.
that the pri"mary fund is
demands upon it.

The presumption is,
sufficient to meet the

Why then permit in equity a re-

sort to another fund and tht.s give rise to a second
action for its reimbursement?

Besides, these Eng-

lish decisions permitting the creditors to proceed
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in

the first

instance in

equity against the estate

of the deceased partner, are in conflict with the
established doctrine that parties must first exhaust their legal remedies before resorting to courts
of equity.

This rule is well settled in New York

and has been followed in many American cases.
The estate of the deceased partner may
be released from liability to creditors by acts of
the parties conclustvely showing such an intention.
The different holdings of the English and American
tribunals, however, affect the results.
In

a case in which it

was sought to hold

the estate of a deceased partner, it was set up as
a defence that an agreement had been made with the
survivors whereby the money due the creditors was
contributed by the deceased as capital to the copartnership newly formed by the survivors.

it was

held that if such defence was affimatively proven
it would be valid , but it could not be inferred
from the fact that the creditor dealt exclusively
with the survivors and recgnized them as his debt-
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ors.

He could do this as they were his exclus:ve

debtors at la; and his primary debtors in equity,
without in any way 2elinquishing the secondary
liabilkty of the deceased partner. (Forgarty v.
Cullen, 49 Super. Ct.,397)
In anothor case a partnership was dissolved by agreement; one of the partners was to
settle the affairs.
partner died.

Shortly afterwards the other

One of the creditors thereafter ac-

cepted a note signed by the surviving

artner, and

on his subsequent insolvency, brought an action
against the estate of the deceased.

It was held

that the acceptance of the note under these circumstances did not indicate any intention to release
the estate of the deccased partner. (Titus v. Todd,
25 N.J.Eq., 458)
So much for the American examples.

One

of the English decisions is founain the case of
Bilborowuh v. Holmes, (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 255) in
which a firm consisting of two partners was in the
habit of issuing deposit notes.

After issuing a

number of these,

they took in

of the old firm died.

two new partners.

One

The business was adverti sod

to be continued under t'ie old firm name.

The re-

maining old partner died and the business was carried on by the new partners.

Subsequently the

firm went into bankruptcy and all the holders of
these notes proved their claims in only this proceeding.

1When, later, an action was begun to set-

tle the estate of the partner who first died, the
holders of the notes asked to be admitted as creditors.

They were all holders of notes at the time

the testator died and had all received interest
from the new partners.

All knew of the death of

the testator and had never before made a claim, but
some had not altered the amount after deposit,
others had increased it and had received new deposit notes from the new partners, and still others
had diminished it and had also received new notes.
It.was held that as to all claims, the acceptance
of interest by the new partners worz.ed a complete
novation and released the estate of the old partners.

Such is the result of a conscientious
effort to present acceptably the results of an investigation of this subject.

Flaws there are, un-

doubtedly, but it is to be remembered that the
theme is one worthy a master's mind--a distinction
the present writer cannot claim.

